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Introduction

Piece-rate wages have been in existence since 604
B.C., when Babylonian women were paid with food; the amount
of food

they received was dependent upon the amount of

cloth they could weave (Alford, cited in Shapiro, 1978).
During the 1500's, wh ile the fleet called the nArsenal of
Venice'' was being constructed, many progressive labor concepts were implemented to ensure the highest quality and
the highest productivity of shipbuilders.

AITI()ng

thes e

concepts was the use of a piece-rate incent i ve syste m
(Lane, cited in Shapiro, 1978).

During the English

industrial revolution, it was common knowledge that an
individual working in a piece-rate incentive situation was
likely to p r oduce more than one working for a daily or
weekly wage (George, 1972).

It is not a recent

d ~ s~overy

that a piece-rate incentive plan, as a means of administering wages, can motivate workers to produce more than can
wages paid on an hourly basis.

Many studies and authors

have provided evidence to this fact (e.g., Lawler, 1971;
McManis & Dick,l973; Pritchard, Dunnette, & Jorgenson,
1972; Rothe, 1946; Schneider & Olson, 1970; Schwab, 1973i
Shapiro, 1978).

Furthermore, managers and scientists have

actively sought to improve the effectiveness of piece-rate
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incentive plans through various methods.

One of the

primary ways has been to manipulate the amount of money
received for each unit produced.

Other methods include

establishing scientific techniques on which to base rates,
as well as developing various types of piece-rate incentive plans, such as differential

piece~rate

plans,

multiple piece-rate plans and task and premium bonus
systems (Lawler, 1971).
Although research indicates that piece-rate incentive
plans will generally increase production, research has
also evidenced side effects that serve to limit the effectiveness of piece-rate incentive plans (Lawler, 1971).
The side effect that has received the greatest amount of
attention is the presence of norms that serve to restrict
production.

Mathewson (cited in Lawler, 1971) concluded

that workers on a piece-rate plan in a machine shop
produced only 50 percent of what they were capable of
producing.

Parsons (1974) reported that regardless of

management's efforts to improve the effectiveness of the
incentive system, workers in the Bank Wiring Room Study at
Hawthorne maintained a steady production rate.

Both

Parsons and Mathewson stated that group norms were present
that served to restrict production beyond an acceptable
rate.

Each worker, in both situations, was careful not to

exceed the limit.

Conformity to the norms which served to
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restrict production was ensured by threats of social ostracism, degradation, and even physical punishment.

Workers

in both studies reported that fear of the lowering of the
rates, reduction of hours and loss of jobs were their
reasons for restricting production.
Whyte (1955) compiled a detailed analysis of incentive
systems and their implications in industry.

Although 10

years earlier Rothe {1946) had concluded that production
was a function of the magnitude of incentives available to
workers, Whyte realized other implications of incentive
systems and their effects on production.

Whyte understood

the group pressure to conform to norms that restricted
production.

He stated that the worker

respon~s

not only to

the monetary reward offered by the incentive plan, but also
to the total factory environment in which the individual
works.

This, of course, includes one's co-workers.

Thus,

one stands in a state of confusion as to which stimulus to
respond to:

the incentive plan or the co-worker.

Whyte

(1955) suggested that the incentive plan places the worker
in a situation of being unable to determine whether the
symbols ("words or physical objects that come to stand for
relations of man to man, man to the physical world, and
also for relations between man and physical objects and
other men", p. 191) presented represent reward, punishment
or a combination of the two.

Whyte further suggested that
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a given response would be highly influenced by the human
relations within the situation.
In the development of a theory of human relations and
incentives, Whyte expanded on the influence of co-workers
and the work group first discussed by Roethlisberger and
Dickson (summarized in Hornans, 1950}.

Whyte brought out

the fact that the workers perceived themselves as constituting one group and perceived management as constituting
another group, both possessing their own norms and values,
as well as their own structures and leaders.

While

production is a primary interest of both groups, it is
viewed from two frames of reference.
maximize production and lower cost.

Management desires to
The workers wish to

produce enough to receive a fair wage; however, for reasons
known o nly to the workers, they will not produce up to
their full potential.

Thus, workers conforming to the

group norms that serve to restr1ct production add stability
to the group.

Whyte also points out that a change in the

incentive rate would disrupt the stability of the group.
From the worker's point of view, an increase in production
would most likely result in a change in the incentive
rate.

Thus conforming to group norms that restricted

production served two purpos~~:

a) to increase stability

of the work group, and b) to decrease the threat of
disruption of group stability.

From this point, Whyte
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seems to be inadvertently leading to the conclusion that if
the two groups could perhaps trust one another, norms that
serve to restrict production would not possess such significance.

Although Whyte (1955) suggested that ''financial

incentives are both a technical engineering problem and a
human relations problem"

(p.261), he failed to make sugges-

tions or recommendations which would perhaps create a work
environment conducive to a positive response to a piecerate incentive system.
Group-Based Plans
In a reexamination of the Hawthorne effect, Parsons
(1974) suggested additional reasons for the findings at
Hawthorne that are supported by more recent research.
Parsons noted that the generally accepted assumption that
any change resulted in increased productivity is a myth.
He stated that this assumption is not supported by all of
the data gathered at Hawthorne.

In an analysis of the

inconsistent findings leading to the myth, Parsons noted
several important distinctions between the different experimental situations.
did,

In the situations where production

in fact, rise significantly (in the Relay Assembly

Test Room), workers felt assured that incentives would not
decrease, indicating a climate of trust between workers and
management.

Parsons suggests this is perhaps a necessary

condition for rate increases, but not a sufficient
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condition.

Attention must also be given to the fact

that, in the Relay Assembly Test Room, workers were paid on
the small-group compensation basis (five workers constituted a group).

Therefore, each worker perceived a closer

relationship between pay and performance (March & Simon;
Marriot; Whyte; cited in Parsons 1974}.

In addition,

Parsons (1974) suggested that "subsequent performance was
adjusted as a result of information received about prior
performance" {p.928).

Although research on the pure

motivational effects of information feedback is controversial (Chapanis, 1964), Locke (1968) found that information
feedback does have cueing effects, as well as a goalsetting motivational effect.

Locke found that subjects

established goals as a result of receiving feedback on
prior performance.

In summary, Parsons, referring to group

plans, stated three conditions that would lead to a
positive response to a piece-rate incentive system in a
group situation:

trust that management will not lower the

incentive rate, pay that is more directly related to
performance, and a system which allows for meaningful
feedback on performance.
Numerous studies have researched the predictability of
expectancy

theo~y

performance.

in regard to employee motivation and

Heneman and Schwab (1972) provided an inform-

ative evaluation of this research, as did Graen (1969).
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Additional research has been specifically directed toward
incentive and compensation systems and their relationships
to employee performance, satisfaction and effort (Galbraith
& Cummings, 1967; Hackman & Porter, 1968; Schwab, 1973;

Schwab & Dyer, 1973; Yukl, Wexley, & Seymore, 1972).

Of

particular interest is a study carried out by Camrnann and
Lawler (1973).

In an effort to compare two group-based pay

incentive plans, one perceived as successful and one
perceived as unsuccessful, the authors revealed three
conditions that were thought to elicit a positive response
to the incentive plan perceived to be successful:

1) a

trusting climate between workers and management, 2) a close
relationship between pay and performance, and 3) a pay plan
that is easily understood and is therefore meaningful.
Cammann and Lawler stated that expectancy theory predicts a
positive response to an incentive plan where the three
conditions are met.

The employee's response to the incen-

tive system was deemed positive by virtue of the fact that
workers sought to produce as much as possible.

In addi-

tion, there were no apparent norms present serving to
restrict production and thus no sanctions, such as social
isolation or ostracism, to ensure conformity of the norms.
In fact, workers stated, " ••• the group and supervisor
supported higher productivity"

(p. 166).

The conclusion

that expectancy theory could successfully predict the

)
I
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positive response was made after comparing performance
behavior predicted by a mathematical model to actual
employee performance.

Although these findings of predicta-

bility remain important, the assessment of the three
conditions which enhance the likelihood of a positive
response to the incentive plan are of particular interest.
These conditions are highly similar to the conditions
stated by Parsons (1974) and the importance of each has
been exemplified in one or more of the following studies
which were directed toward expectancy theory and
performance, satisfaction and effort:

Galbraith and

Cummings (1967), Graen (1969), James, Hartman, Stebbins,
and Jones (1977), Lawler ana Hackman (1969), and Schwab,

(1973) suggested that tying pay to performance was a
necessary condition in order for an incentive plan to exert
a significant and predictable impact on performance.

In

addition, Schwab (1973) found that employees tended to be
more highly motivated where pay was perceived as being
directly related to performance.

In reference to trust

between management and workers, Lawler and Hackman (1969)
concluded that trust was an important determinant of
employee response to pay incentive systems.

James, et al.

(1977) found that psychological climate was significantly
related to various instrumentalities; consequently, one may
safely conclude that a trusting climate does effect
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performance.

In reference to "a plan that is easily

understood," it would be virtually impossible to design an
incentive plan where pay was perceived to be directly
related to performance, but the plan was too complex to be
understood.

Carnmann and Lawler (1973) reported that of the

two group plans included in the study, the successful
incentive plan was much less complex than the unsuccessful
plan where one encountered great difficulty in calculating
one's pay for a given time period.
Individual-Based Plans
Lawler {1971) stated, "It has been suggested, although
not proven, that restrictive norms are less likely to
develop when a group incentive plan is used"

(p. 129)$

The

fact that neither Cammann and Lawler (1973) nor Parsons
(1974) addressed individual-based incentive plans, leaves a
significant aspect of pay incentive plans unresolved.

The

purpose of the present investigation is to address the
following issue:

Are restrictive norms a thing of the past

in a factory where large amounts of money are budgeted each
year for human relations concerns, or do these norms still
serve to undermine the work of engineers, human relations
departments and management?

More specifically, can

restrictive norms be eliminated in individual pay-incentive
situations, as well as in group pay-incentive situations
through the presence of the three conditions (a trusting
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climate between management and workers, a pay plan that is
easily understood and thus allowing for meaningful feedback and a plan where pay is directly related to
performance) suggested by Camrnann and Lawler (1973) and
Parsons (1974) and supported by additional recent applied
psychological research?

It is hypothesized that the

presence of the three conditions will preclude the presence
of restrictive norms in individual-based pay situations, as
well as in group-based pay situations.
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Method
Subjects
The subjects consisted of 60 individuals working under
pay incentive plans in a large industrial manufacturing
plant, 28 under a group plan and 32 under an individual
plan.

All subjects held skilled positions and were random-

ly selected.

Basic

demographi~

data were collected to

determine the comparability of the two groups.
are presented in Table 1.

The results

A slight difference in age was

found between the means of the two groups {31.31<36.86,
p<.OS).

A

difference in the average number of years with

the company was also significant (6<7.59, p<.OS).
Questionnaire
A

quest:onnaire was used to collect the following data:

demographic, control variables (presenc~ of the three
conditions) and dependent variable (absence or presence of
restrictive norms).

A copy of the questionnaire is

presented in the Appendix.
the control variables.

Items 1-4 were each measures of

Item 1 measured the degree of the

perceived relationship between pay and performance.

Items

2 and 4 measured varying degrees of understanding of the
pay plan.

Item 3 measured the degree of trust that the pay

plan would not be changed.
Items 4-8 composed a scale to determine the absence or
presence of restrictive norms.

Absence or presence of
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Table 1
Comparison of Demographic Data
Item

.Age

Individual-Based

Group-Based

Pay Plans

Pay Plans

(n=32)

(n=28)

X

= 31.31

X

= 36.86

s

=

s

=

-

= 12.19

-

X

= 11.75

s

-

7.6

t-va1ue

-2.42*

9.85

Number of
Years
Completed
in School

X

s -

1.42

1.13

1.6

Number of
Years in
Company

* p<.05

X

=

6

-X

=

7.59

s

=

2.63

s

=

2.19

-2.65*
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restrictive norms could also be termed the degree of
successfulness of a pay plan.
The degree of agreement or disagreement to each item
was measured on a seven-point graphic rating scale.

The

numbers were defined as follows:
7 -

Completely Agre·e

6 - Mostly Agree

5 -

Slightly Agree

4 - Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 -

Slightly Disagree

2 -

Mostly Disagree

1 -

Completely Disagree

Procedure
The study was conducted in an industrial manufacturing
plant that utilized individual-based and group-based pay
incentive plans.
over 12 months.

All of the plans had been in effect for
In fact, they had been relatively

unchanged since the opening of this particular plant more
than 10 years ago.

The study was carried out inside the

plant.
Subjects that worked the afternoon shift reported to
work one-half hour early while subjects that worked the day
shift remained one-half hour after the end of their shift.
Thus, the study involved two separate sessions in which the
subjects completed the questionnaires.

The same procedure
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was used in both sessions.

Each subject was given a

questionnaire which was marked to correspond with the type
of pay plan under which they worked, I for those working
under an individual-based plan and I I for those working
under a group-based plan.

Questionnaires remained face-

down until everyone received their copy.

The experimenter

then read the directions and asked if there were any
questions regarding what they were to do.

Subjects were

asked to raise their hand upon completing the questionnaire
so the experimenter could collect them.

Everyone was asked

to sit quietly until all questionnaires had been collected.
In addition, subjects were informed that the experimenter was an external constultant not employed by nor
under contract by the organization.

The subjects were also

informed that the organization would, however, receive the
results of the study.
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Results
Table 2 presents the group means for each item
representing the control variables {presence or absence of
the three conditions) for both groups.

The table also

presents the t-values calculated between the means of the
two groups on each of the items.
The group means calculated for item 1 indicate that
the employees in both the individual-based and group-based
groups perceive a relationship between their pay and their
performance.

The difference between the two means was not

signif i cant at the .05 level of confidence.
The group means calculated for items 2 and 4, related
item s , indicate that the employees in both groups understand the pay plan and can actually calculate their weekly
earnings.

The difference between the two means was not

significant at the .05 level of confidence.
The group means calculated for item 3 indicate that
the employees in both groups are between slightly disagree
and neutral in terms of their trust that the pay plan would
not be changed regardless of how much they

produced~

The

difference between the means was not significant at the .05
level of confidence.
The absence or presence of restricted norms was
measured on a four-item scale.

Group means were calculated

for both groups to determine whether or not the employees
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perceived restrictive norms operating within their work
group.

As defined by the rating scale, a mean of greater

than 4 would indicate that the employees perceived no
restrictive norms operating within the work group.

The

means, 6.12 for the individual-based group and 5.76 for the
group-based group, indicate that both groups perceive no
norms operating within the work group which serve to
restrict production.

A t-test indicated that the

difference between the means was not significant (t = 1.2,
alpha= .05).
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Table 2
Group Means Describing Work Attitudes
Individual - Based

Item

Pay Plans

*t-

Pay Plans

value

{n=28)

(n=32)
1.

Group-Based

'fhe amount of
pay that I
earn depends on
how hard I

2.

I

work.

5.25

5. 4 3

-.36

5.97

6.32

1,06

3.53

3.43

.. 16

5.22

5.96

understand how
my wages are
calculated.

3•

No matter how much
I

produce, the

company will
never change my
rate of pay.
4.

I

can easily
figure out
how much I

should

be paid at the
end of the week.

*

No t-values were significant (alpha

=

.05)

-1.48
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Discussion
The results indicate that there are no restrictive
norms operating within either of the work groups that
participated in the study.

This finding appears to be a

statement regarding the success of the pay plans in
eliciting a positive reaction from the employees.

Subjects

reported that they seek to earn as much as possible by
producing as much as possible and do not feel any pressure
to produce less than possible from fellow workers, nor do

fellow workers interfere with their attempts to achieve
high productivity.

More often than not, management would

agree that attitudes and opinions such as these would be an
indication of a successful pay incentive plan, or plans, as

the case may be.
voluminous.

The importance of these findings is

Every pay incentive plan developed and

utilized by management is intended to elicit a positive
response.

However, the factors that affect the degree of

success of a pay plan are of overriding importance.

Isola-

tion of these factors could lead to a prescription for
successful pay plans.

Although this study was not intended

to isolate factors that could elicit a positive response to
pay incentive plans, the study intended to and was successful in providing information on three factors believed to
be important in eliciting a positive response to a pay
incentive plan.
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The three factors which were measured in this study
are the relationship between pay and performance, understanding of the pay plan and an attitude of worker trust
toward management regarding the pay plan.

The results

indicate that two of the factors are present to a very high
degree in both the groups participating in the study.
Subjects in both groups strongly agreed that the amount of
pay they earned depended on how hard they worked.

This

indicates a strong relationship between pay and performance, a factor given significance by both Lawler (1973)
and Parsons (1974).

Subjects in both groups also strongly

agreed that they understood the pay plan under which they
worked, another factor given significance by both Lawler
(1973) and Parsons (1974).

In fact, subjects in both

groups stated that they were able to calculate their weekly
pay, which was a bit surprising to management and industrial engineers.

This is not to say that management and

engineers intended for the plan to be difficult to
understand.

It was believed a problem could exist here

because the plans under which both groups worked had to
allow for downtime and changeovers, as well as for
production of the individual or the group.

The fact that

the workers understood the pay incentive plan under which
they work indicates they were receiving meaningful feedback
regarding their performance.
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There was overwhelming evidence of the presence of
two influential factors in both groups participating in
the study.

Evidence of the presence of a third factor,

trust that management would not change the pay plans, no
matter how much one produced, is not so clear-cut.

Means

of 3.53 for Group I and 3.43 for Group II appear to
indicate that both groups are at least neutral.

That is,

they are neithe r in agreement nor in disagreement with the
statement "No matter how much I produce, the Company will
never change my rate of pay".

An important fact to bring

out here is the variance of the scores obtained on this
item for both groups.

A variance of 6o45 for Group I and

a variance of 5.07 for Group II indicates that a high
degree of disagreement exist among the workers in both
groups concerning trust that management will never change
the pay plan as a result of exceedingly high production.
Workers were either highly confident that management would
not change the plan or they were quite sure that
exceedingly high production would result in a change in
the pay plan.

The issue is, without a doubt, affected by

present economic conditions.

Although the company has

experienced no major layoffs or cutbacks in production,
present economic conditions hardly allow one to feel
immune from the possibility of layoffs and cutbacks.
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The effect of present economic conditions on worker
attitudes leads the experimenter to consider that the
minimal lack of trust among workers that management will
not change the rate of pay may not be a true lack of trust
in management at all.

It is apparent that the organization

has no control over the present national economic condition,
and thus has very little control over worker attitudes
concerning possible changes in incentive rates.

The fact

that factors external to the organization may have elicited
a neutral response to the item measuring the presence of
this condition is particularly likely in this instance as
the orga n ization has never lowered rates or altered the pay
system unless a change has been made in the work method or
machinery.

The management reportedly continues to make

this policy clear to all employees and are proud of their
adherence to this policy.
Nonetheless, data do not allow the the experimenter
to state that the trust in management factor is present for
either of the two groups.

However, the fact that workers

reported an absence of restrictive norms in both groups
indicates that the organizational climate is such that
workers under both individual-based and group-based plans
work to earn as much as possible by producing as much as
possible.

Is this not the bottom line in the development

and implementation of incentive pay plans; to create
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conditions that elicit positive responses to the structure
of the pay plan?

It seems apparent that workers, in this

study, have weighed the possible positive and negative
outcomes and have responded positively to both the
individual-based plan and the group-based plan.
In summary, it was hypothesized

th~t

presence of the

three factors would preclude the presence of restrictive
norms in group-based, as well as individual-based pay
incentive plans.

The results indicate that perhaps the

presence of only two of the factors precluded the presence
of restrictive norms in both groups in this situation as
the presence of one of the factors is unclear.

This

finding is contrary to a suggestion made by Lawler (1971),
and mentioned previously, that restrictive norms are less
likely to be present in a group-based pay incentive plan.
It is important to point out that the external validity of
these findings is somewhat limited by virtue of the fact
that it was carried out in only one environment.

However,

the study did partially confirm the findings of Lawler
(1973) and the suggestions of Parsons {1974), both of whom
specified the importance of the three factors

(relationship

between pay and performance, understanding the pay plan and
trust that management will not change the pay plan) in
precluding the presence of restrictive norms.

Thus the

findings remain important in the quest to isolate the
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factors which enhance the success of pay incentive plans.
Related future research should perhaps provide more
empirical evidence on the factors discussed in this study
in addition to discovering conditions or methods to
maximize the effects of the factors.
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APPENDIX
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Age - - - - - -

Number of Years in 'Ihis Position

Number of Years Cbrnpleted in School
Number of Years with the

-----------Cbmpany
------------

INSTRUcriONS:

Carefully read the following statements and choose the
description on the 7-point scale provided for each
statement which most closely describes your degree of
agreement or disagreement by placing the corresponding
number from the scale in the blank beside each statement.

1.

'Ihe arrount of pay that I earn depends on hOW' hard I work.

-----

7

= Completely Agree

= Mostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
6

4

= Neither Agree nor Disagree

3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Completely Disagree

2.

I understand how my wages are calculated.

7 = Oompletely Agree
6 = Mostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Cbmpletely Disagree

-----

3.

lb matter how much I produce, the Company will never
change my rat.e of pay.

7 = Completely Agree
6 = Y.ostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Completely Disagree
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_ _ _ _ _ 4.

I can easily figure out how much I should be p3.id at the
end of the week.
7 = Completely Agree
6 = Mostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Completely Disagree

- - - - - 5.

I w:>rk at a pace that best fits my own attitude as to

how much

should produce.

I

7 = Completely Agree
6 = Mostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Corrpletely Disagree

- - - - - 6.

I

as

try to earn as much as pc>ssible by producing as much
I can.
7 = Completely Agree
6 = Mostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Oompletely Disagree

- - - - - 7.

8.

I don • t feel any pressure frcm fellow workers to produce

less than

I

can produce.
7 = Completely Agree
6 = Mostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Completely Disagree

Fellow- workers do not interfere with 1t!f attempts to
proouce as ITUJCh as I can.
7 = Oompletely Agree
6 = Mostly Agree
5 = Slightly Agree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
2 = Mostly Disagree
1 = Oompletely Disagree
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